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The term, dividends, while equally applicable to a distribution
of the capital of a corporation among its stockholders, more com-
monly relates to its declared and divisible earnings. As such, it
is the purpose of this article to consider them with reference to
the manner in which, and by whom, they -are to be properly
ascertained and declared; the rights of creditors of the corpora-
tion, as thereby affected; their ownership as between stockholders
and their vendees and between life-tenants and remaindermen ;
with some consideration of the peculiar interests of the guaranteed,
or preferred, stockholders of a corporation.
It is fundamental that dividends are payable only from the
profits of the corporation, and that they cannot be paid from any
portion of the capital stock, from compensation for property
taken under the power of eminent domain, from a penalty recov-
ered from a contractor for a failure to complete his work, or from
the sale of forfeited stock, a Indeed, in some of the States, e. g.,
New York, the statutes declare a director making a dividend with-
drawing any portion of the capital stock, guilty of a misdemeanor.
The capital represents the property of a corporation and must
remain as security to the creditors until their claims are satisfied.
When this security is diminished by its division among the share-
holders, in whatever form it may be undertaken, their rights are
violated and they are entitled, not only to enjoin such a distribu-
tion when made in the nature of dividends, but, as we shall pres-
ently see, may follow such a division in the hands of the stock-
holders participating therein.
a Curran v. State of Arkansas, IS How. 307; Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., v,.
Howard, 7 Wall 392 ; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308 ; Union Nat. Bank v.
Douglass. I McCray 86 ; National Trust Co. v. Miller, 33 N. J. Eq. I55 ; Bart-
lett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 589 ; Re National Funds Ass. Co., L. R., io Ch. Div.
i8; Heard v. Eldridge, 109 Mass. 258; Bloxam v. Metropolitan R. R. Co., L.
R. 3 Ch. App. Cases 337; Gratz v,. Redd, 4 B. Mon. 187.
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While the ascertainment of the net earnings of a corporation
is, perhaps, more a matter of business policy, governed by a
sound and conservative judgment, exercised on the one hand so
as to preserve the permanent interests of its creditors and stock-
holders, represented by its certificates of indebtedness and capital,
and, on the other, to fairly distribute among its shareholders the
earned accretions upon their holdings, yet, the courts have not hes-
itated to lay down rules under which dividends are to be ascertained
and declared. They are clearly stated in Belfast Railroad Co. v.
City of Belfast, where the Supreme Court of Maine, said:
"In a general sense, net earnings are the gross receipts less the expenses
of operating the road to earn such receipts. But several kinds of charges
must first come out of net earnings before dividends are declared. The
creditor comes in for consideration before the stockholder. The property of a
corporation is a trust fund pledged for the payment of its debts. Therefore, if
there is a bonded, funded, permanent, or standing debt, the interest on it must
be reckoned out of net earnings. If there is a floating debt, which it is not
wise and prudent to place in the form of a funded debt, or to postpone for later
payment, that should also be paid. If the financial situation of the company
is such as to render it expedient to commence or continue the scheme of a sink-
ing fund for the extinguishment of the company's indebtedness some day or
other, an annual contribution out of the net earnings for that purpose would
be reasonable. These deductions made from the net earnings, the balance will
be the profits of the company distributable among stockholders." b
There seems to be some variance of custom among corporations
in charging improvements, or betterments, to construction or to
expense account. That the latter is the best and most conserva-
tive course, at least with reference to the use of a portion of the
earnings, has received judicial approval in Union Pacific R. R.
Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 402, where Mr. Justice Bradley
observed :
-,With regard to the last-mentioned class of expenditures, however,
namely, those which are incurred in enlarging and improving the works, a dif-
ference of practice prevails among railroad companies. Some charge to con-
struction account every item of expense and every part and portion of every
item which goes to make the road or any of its appurtenances or equipment
better than they were before ; while others charge to ordinary expense account,
and against earnings, whatever is taken for these purposes from the earnings,
and is not raised upon bonds or issues of stock. The latter method is deemed
the most conservative and beneficial for the company, and operates as a
b Belfast R. R. Co. v. City of Belfast, 77 Me. 445. See also St. John v.
Erie Ry. Co., 22 Wall. 136; New York, etc. R. R. Co. v. Nickals, i 9 U. S.
2o6; Barry v. Merchant's Exch., i Sandf. Ch. 307; Williams v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162 ; Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 4o N. J. Eq.
1i4 ; Culver a. Reno Real Estate Co., 91 Pa. St. 367; Stringer's Case L. R., 4
Ch. App. Cases 475.
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restraint against injudicious dividends and an accumulation of a heavy indebt-
edness. The temptation is, to make expenses appear as small as possible, so
as to have a large apparent surplus to divide. But it is not regarded as the
wisest and most prudent method. The question is one of policy, which is
usually left to the discretion of the directors. There is but little danger that
any board will cause a very large or undue portion of their earnings to be
absorbed in permanent improvements. The practice will only extend to those
which may be required from time to time by the gradual increase of the com-
pany's traffic, the despatch of business, the public accommodation, and the
general permanency and completeness of the work. When any important
improvement is needed, such as an additional track, or any other matter which
involves a large outlay of money, the owners of the road will hardly forego the
entire suspension of dividends in order to raise the requisite funds for those
purposes; but will rather take the ordinary course of issuing bonds or addi-
tional stock. But for making all ordinary improvements as well as repairs, it
is better for the stockholders and all those who are interested in the prosperity
of the enterprise, that a portion of the earnings should be employed."
Again, some corporations devote a portion of their earnings,
annually, to a reduction of their original construction account, or,
in other words, the cost of their plant. With manufacturing, rail-
road, and other companies employing a large portion of their cap-
ital in buildings, machinery, roadbeds, rolling stock, and the like,
where their use must, of necessity, cause deterioration, it would
seem only prudent to create a surplus from annual earnings, out
of which the property, thus depreciated, can be replaced. It is
done by annually crediting construction account with a percent-
age of its cost and retaining the earnings, thus reserved, as a sur-
plus fund. If the deterioration is constantly being mended such
a course might not be necessary, but, in companies, like those
engaged in manufacturing, where their plants necessarily are
wearing out without the need of immediate replacement, such a
course would not only be wise, but should always be adopted.
A corporation is not denied the privilege of paying dividends,
when earned, even if largely indebted, provided such indebted-
ness is taken into consideration in determining what are the net
earnings to be distributed, and an English case has gone so far as
to hold it to be not improper to borrow money for the purpose of
paying a dividend, provided a surplus remains after deducting the
capital and indebtedness of the company from a fair valuation of
its assets. c But no American case has been found warranting
such a course.
Mr. Morawetz, in his work on Private Corporations (2d Ed-
§§44, 44r), says, that in ascertaining if a dividend has been
c Stringer's Case, L. R. 4 Ch. App. Cases 475.
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earned, the property of a corporation may be valued at cost, even
if it could not be sold again except at a loss, provided such depre-
ciation has not been caused by design, accident, or wear and tear
in using the property, or from losses incurred in carrying on its
business. In most cases these exceptions would eat out the heart
of the rule.
The directors, being the agents of the corporation, alone have
the power to determine the amount and to declare a dividend
from its earnings-a power resting in their honest discretion,
uncontrollable by the courts, when not exercised illegally, wan-
tonly or oppressively. A prosperous corporation, with provision
for its indebtedness and its future prosperity, must divide a rea-
sonable proportion of its earnings among its stockholders, though
the right to reserve a portion to increase its surplus and enlarge
its business, or to replace its property deteriorating from use, can-
not be denied. While courts will interfere with the discretion of
the directors with great reluctance, and only in rare and excep-
tional instances, yet, when they are acting in bad faith, or from a
wilful abuse of their discretion, equity will grant relief to a stock-
holder and decree a proper distribution of the earnings among the
shareholders of the corporation ; but an action at law will not lie,
nor is mandamus the proper remedy. It is evident, however, that
each case must be governed by its own circumstances, the ques-
tion being largely controlled by the use to which the capital is put,
and the intention of the charter of the corporation. d
Dividends must be declared alike upon the same class of stock,
but the time and place of payment, within reasonable limits, can
be fixed by the directors, and, when determined, each stockholder
must claim and take his share sub modo. The right of a stock-
holder, at law, to a share of the profits does not arise until a divi-
dend has been declared, although, as we have seen, he may, under
some circumstances, obtain the assistance of equity to enforce the
declaration of a dividend. But when a dividend has been
declared and the time of payment has arrived, the stockholder,
after demand made, may sue the corporation in indebitatus assumit
for his share of such dividends ; all community of interest in rela-
tion thereto, as between the stockholders themselves and between
dNew York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nickals, i19 U. S. 296 ; King v. Paterson
R. R. Co., 29 N. J. Law 88 ; Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 4o N. J. Eq.
14; Boardmdn v. Lake Shore R. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 157; Williams v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162 ; Chaffee v. RutlandR. R. Co., 55 Vt. rio ; Beers
v'. Bridgeport Spring Co., 42 Conn. 17 ; Brown v. Railway Co., 13 Beav. 32;
Rex v. Bank England, 2 Barn. & Ald. 620.
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the stockholders and the corporation, is at an end ; his right is a
separate and independent one; the true principle being that when
a dividend is declared, eo ins/anti a debt is thereby created against
the corporation in favor of each stockholder for his proportionate
share of the dividend: the right of each stockholder to his divi-
dend becomes individualized and therefrom arises an implied
promise to pay it on demand, enforceable by action. e It has also
been held that equity will enforce the payment of a declared divi-
dend, and also that mandamus will not lie. f
Stock dividends may be declared by the directors of a corpora-
tion, but they cannot be declared unless the directors have power
under its charter to issue new shares, and there are legal profits to
distribute; governed also by the requirement of a proper exercise
of their discretionary power to withhold cash dividends, and, by
the issue of such new stock, thereby retain these profits for the
future use of the corporation. g A stock dividend may also prac-
tically be made by issuing stock at par, although the stock so
issued is worth much more than par. This is entirely proper,
under such circumstances, and is of very common occurrence.
Each stockholder, however, is entitled to take or purchase the
new stock in the proportion his former holdings have to the new
issue, and, in general, new stock cannot be offered to others until
the stockholders have first been given the option to purchase.
When the dividend has been declared it is irrevocable, and the
stockholders may claim his share even if the corporation has suf-
fered losses, or has become insolvent between the time the divi-
dend was declared, if properly declared, and the time of payment.
Tlis is upon the principle, already stated, that a proper dividend,
when declared, instantly puts the stockholder, with relation
thereto, on the footing of a creditor of the corporation. Nor can
the creditors of a corporation recover such dividends from the
shareholders, or from the directors, whete they have been declared
and paid in good faith, although after the dividends were declared
and paid, the corporation became insolvent. h But when the
e King v. Paterson R. R. Co., 29 N. J. Law 82 ; West Chester R. R. Co. v.
Jackson, 77 Pa. St. 321 ; Granger v. Bassett, 98 Mass. 462 ; Jermain v. Lake
Shore R. R. Co., 91 N. Y. 483 ; State v. Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co., 6 Gill (Md.)
363 ; City v. Cleveland R. R. Co., 6 Ohio 490.
f Beers v. Bridgeport Spring Co., 42 Conn. 17 ; Leroy v. Globe Ins. Co., 2
Edw. Ch. 657 ; Van Norman v. Central Car Co., 41 Mich. i66.
g Rand v. Hubbell, 115 Mass. 461 ; Com. v. Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. Co., 74
Pa. St. 83 ; Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., 47 Conn. 141.
A Le Roy v. Globe Ins. Co., 2 Edw. Ch 657 ; In Re Le Blanc, 14 Hun. 8;
Reid v. Eatontown Mfg. Co., 4o Ga. 98.
YAZE LAW .]O URNAL.
dividends are paid from the capital, which is thereby deteriorated
and consequent loss ensues to its creditors, both the stockholders
aud directors may be proceeded against, at law or in equity, and
compelled to repay the amounts improperly paid. It is well
settled doctrine, that the capital stock and property of every corpo-
ration constitute a trust fund for the benefit of the general cred-
itors of the corporation, on which such creditors have a lien and
the right to priority of payment over any stockholder ; if the cap-
ital is, in whole or in part, diverted to dividends, the creditors may
follow it into the hands of the stockholders and recover it back;
the stockholders being affected with notice of the trust character
of the capital stock, and cannot be considered to be in the position
of bona fide holders. But the action cannot be maintained until the
creditor has first obtained a valid judgment against the corpora-
tion, and, by proper process, exhausted its remaining assets.i
Nice questions might arise if directors, who had improperly
declared and paid a dividend, should seek to recover contribution
from the stockholders for their proportion of the amounts, which
the directors, as such, had been compelled to refund to defrauded
stockholders. If, however, the stockholders were ignorant of the
fraud, and had been led to believe by the directors that the divi-
dends had been declared from divisible earnings, it would seem,
on principle, that the action could not be maintained.
Dividends are payable to the stockholders of record on the
books of the company at the date of their declaration, and its offi-
cers are justified in so paying them, unless notified of the rights
of equitable assignees ; and the rule applies equally to dividends
payable before or after a transfer is made. j As between the
vendor and purchaser of stock, their agreement, of course, will
determine the one to whom the dividends are to be paid: but, in
the absence of such an agreement, it is settled that the purchaser
is entitled to all dividends subsequently declared, without refer-
ence to the time they were earned, on the ground that he takes
the stock with all its incidents, and is substituted, in all respects, to
the position of the vendor; and, also, that the dividends due on
stock follow the ownership thereof. It is also equally clear that
the vendor is entitled to the dividend declared and payable at the
iCounty of Morgan v. Allen, 103 U. S. 498 ; Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y..9; Williams v. Boice, 38 N. J. Eq. 364; Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384.
j Brisbane v. Delaware, etc., R. R. Co., 94 N. Y. 204 ; Cleveland, etc., R.
R. Co. v. Robbins, 35 Ohio 483.
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time of the sale. k Where, however, the dividend was declared
before the sale but'is not payable until afterwards, the rule is not
so well settled: in fact the only two reported decisions, where
this question is distinctly raised and adjudicated, differ in opinion ;
the one awarding the dividend to the purchaser and the other to
the vendor. In Burroughs v. North Carolina R. R. Co. (67 N. C.
376; 12 Am. Rep. 611) decided in 1873, the facts were as follows :
Burroughs, the plaintiff, was the owner of stock in the company
defendant, on which a dividend was declared February i6, 1870,
payable, one half April i, 187o, and one half July i, 1870. On Feb-
ruary i7, 1870, the plaintiff sold and transferred his stock to one
Wiley. Burroughs made demand for this dividend and, upon
refusal, brought suit and recovered judgment against the company
in the court below: on error to the Supreme Court this judgment
was reversed, and the dividend was held to have been properly
paid to Wiley, the vendee. The opinion seems to be based upon
the principle, that the directors intended to make the dividend
payable to the person owning the stock at the date when the divi-
dend was to be paid, although there was nothing in the language
of the resolution in that case to indicate such an intention. Rea-
soning by analogy, the court seemed also to base its opinion upon
the principle that the incident passes with the principal, and,
therefore, that the sale of the stock carried with it future dividends.
The other case is that of Bright v. Lord (51 Indiana 272 ; 19 Am.
Rep. 732), decided ten years later. There, Lord gave to Bright
on April i, x873, an option to purchase certain stock on or before
July i6, 1873, on which date the option was exercised and the
stock transferred to Bright, the vendee. On July 3, 1873, a divi-
dend on this stock was declared payable August i, 1873, and
Bright sought to restrain its payment to Lord, the vendor. The
appellate court, affirming the finding of the lower courts and of
the General Term, held that the vendor was entitled to the divi-
dend, on the ground that it ceased to be an incident to the stock
after its declaration, and this, notwithstanding the outstanding
option to purchase the stock. it seems clear, after a careful
study of these cases, that the decision in Indiana can be better
supported on principle than the one of the courts of North Caro-
lina, and, in the absence of an agreement, that a dividend
declared before the sale, but payable afterwards, must belong to
k March v. Eastern R. R. Co., 43 N. H. 515; Central R. R. Co. v. Papot,
59 Ga. 342 ; Goodwin v. Hardy, 57 Me. i143 ; Jermain v. Lake Shore R. R. Co.,
9i N. Y. 483 ; Gifford v. Thompson, 115 Mass. 478.
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th4 vendor. The rule invoked in Burroughs v. North Carolina
R. R. Co., that the dividend is an incident to the stock and
therefore belongs to the purchaser, would be correct in its
application were the dividend in the case in hand an incident to
the stock ; but, when it is declared, it is supposed to be placed to
the credit of the stockholder, who, as we have before seen, then
becomes, to that extent, a creditor of the corporation; and the
dividend is thereby so separated and disjointed from the principal
as to cease to be an incident to the stock and therefore does not
follow it. The authorities bear out this position. 1
As between life-tenants and remaindermen, the proper appli-
cation of dividends has caused numerous adjudications, not always
harmonious. The questions have arisen when, by deed or will,
there has been granted to one person, for life or for a term of
years, the "income," or the " dividends," or the " dividends and
profits," or the "dividends, interest and profits," or the "interest,
dividends, profits and proceeds, "- all held to be phrases identi-
cal in effect -with remainder over to another at the termination
of the life or particular estate. These questions arise concerning
(a) cash dividends, and (b) stock dividends.
Ordinary or regular dividends declared from the earnings of
the company, and payable in cash, are universally held to belong
to the life-tenant; and this irrespective of the time they were
earned, whether before or after the creation of the life estate; the
doctrine being that dividends, declared in the regular and usual
course of business, were intended to be included within a grant
of the use, income or profits of shares. m In Read v. Head, a
case where the business of the company was to improve certain
land in which its capital had been invested, and, afterwards, to
sell the land at a profit, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held
the life-tenant to be entitled to dividends, declared during his life
tenancy, although paid out of the proceeds of the land purchased
with the capital of the company. This decision seems to be based
I City of Ohio v. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Ohio 489 ; Jones v. Terre
Haute, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Barb. 353; Spear v'. Hart, 3 Robt. (N. Y.) 420 ;Brundage v. Brundage 65 Barb. 397 ; March v. Eastern R. R. Co., 43 N. H.
515 ; De Gendrev. Kent, 4EquityCases 283. IZnreKernochan, 104N.Y.6x8.
m Jermain v. Lake Shore, etc. R. R. Co., gI N. Y. 483 ; Richardson v.
Richardson, 75 Me. 570 ; Bates v. McKinley, 31 Beav. 281 ; Barclay v. Waine-
wright, 14 Vesey 66; Price v'. Anderson, I5 Sine. 473; Hoopes v. Rossiter, i
McLean (C. C) 527.
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upon the fact that the nature, as well as the charter, of the corpo-
ration contemplated earnings in that manner. n
Where the dividends are extraordinary or unusual, and in the
nature of a distribution of accumulated earnings, the rule is not
so well settled. The earlier English cases appropriated such
dividends to the corpus of the trust, but the courts, both of Eng-
land and the United States, now seem generally to agree that
such dividends are payable to the cestui que trust, if they were
earned during the existence of the life tenancy, and, unless a
contrary intent may be inferred from the terms of the resolution
declaring the dividend, or from attending circumstances, that it
will be presumed it was the intention of the corporation to make
the distribution as income and not as capital; some of the cases
going so far as to hold that the bonus, or accumulated earnings,
will be taken to have been earned during the life tenancy. o In
Maine, even a stronger rule has been adopted, for there it seems
to have been held that all cash dividends of earnings to the life-
tenant, are payable irrespective of the time when earned. In Rich-
ardson v. Richardson (75 Me. 5710) the Supreme Court of that
State said :
"But we are well convinced that the general rule, deducible from the
latest and wisest decisions, declares all money dividends to be profits and
income, belonging to the tenant for life, including not only the usual annual
dividend, but all extra dividends or bonuses payable in cash from the earnings
of the company. We are satisfied that this can be the only safe, sound, just
and practical rule, and that any attempt to engraft refined and nice distinctions
upon such rule will be productive of much more evil than any good which can
come from it."
As we shall see, when discussing stock dividends in this connec-
tion, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has adopted a similar
rule. A careful study of all the cases will result in establishing,
we think, the rule first suggested, viz : that unusual cash dividends
belong to the life-tenant as income, unless a contrary intent can
be shown, or reasonably inferred, from the action of the directors,
and that the presumptions are in his favor. In New Jersey a rule
has been adopted which seems to do justice between the parties.
The percentage of accumulated profits to each share is ascertained
as of the time the life estate was created, and also at the com-
n Read v. Head. 6 Allen 174. See also Bulch v. Hallet, io Gray 402;
Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446. Oliver's estate, 136 Pa. St. 43.
o In Re Kernochan, iO4 N. Y. 618 ; Lord v. Brooks, 52 N. H. 72 ; Millen
v. Guenard (Georgia) 21 Am. L. Reg. 381 ; Ashurst v. Field, ii C. B. Greene
I ; Price v. Anderson, 15 Sim. 473 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 15 Jur. 714; Bates v.
McKinley, 31 Beav. 280; In Re Barton's Trust, L. R., s Eq. 238.
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mencement of the action ; if the latter is equal to or greater than
the former, the life-tenant has all the bonus; if it be less, a
deduction is made from the bonus to equalize the amounts, and
the balance is awarded as income, the deduction being deemed
capital..p A similar plan seems to have been adopted in New
Hampshire. y The rule in Pennsylvania is like that in New Jer-
sey, except that the later valuation is as of the time the bonus is
issued rather than of the commencement of the action. r When-
ever it is possible to ascertain these values, it would seem as if the
rule adopted in these States is entirely just and equitable, both to
the owner of the income and the holder of the stock.
Where a corporation had disposed of all its property and fran-
chises, and was about to dissolve its corporate existence, and made
distribution of such sales, including a large amount of earnings
accumulated during the existence of a life tenancy, it was held, in
Massachusetts, that it was the intention of the corporation to dis-
tribute the profits as capital, while in New Hampshire, it was held
to be income and payable to the cestui que trust. s Following
out the principle laid down in other cases in Massachusetts, that
all cash dividends are income, the decision cited would not seem
to be entirely in harmony with those cases. In those States where
the tendency seems to be to give the life-tenant, at least, the benefit
of all dividends earned during his term, it would undoubtedly be
held, as it was in New Hampshire, that he was entitled to'so
much of the distribution as represented profits acquired by the
company during his life tenancy. Such a decision would seem to
be only fair and equitable.
While, as we have seen, the authorities are not entirely har-
monious as to cash dividends of accumulated earnings, there is
still more contrariety among those relating to stock dividends, so
much, indeed, that it is quite difficult to state a general rule. In
England, a recent decision of the House of Lords (Bauch v.
Sproule, 12 App. Cases 385, reversing S. C. 29 Ch. Div. 635), set-
tles the law there, by holding that such dividends are capital and
that the life-tenant is not permitted to share in them. None of the
English cases indicate that any investigation was made to ascer-
tain if the dividend were declared out of profits earned before or
-after the commencement of the life estate. If the latter were
fi Van Doren v. Olden, i9 N. J. Eq. 176.
q Lord v. Brooks, 52 N. H. 72.
r Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368 ; Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 264 ; Smith's
Estate '140 Pa. St. 344.
s Gifford v,. Thompson, ix5 Mass. 478 ; Lord v. Brooks, 52 N. H. 72.
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shown to be true, the decisions of the English courts might be
more in harmony with the majority of the leading American
cases. t In Massachusetts, the English rule is not only followed,
but its courts have held that a distribution of earnings, made after
the testator's death, by stock dividends, must be preserved as cap-
ital irrespective of the time when earned. This makes the rule in
that State very easy of application to the cases of life-tenants and
remaindermen, with reference to all dividends, as those in cash,
however great and irrespective of the time of their accretion, are
awarded to the cestuis que trust, and stock dividends, in every
instance, to the remainderman. u This rule has also been fol-
lowed in Maine. v The convenience of the rule is apparent, but
its justice has been seriously questioned by other courts. On the
other hand, the courts of New York, New Jersey and New Hamp-
shire have gone to the other extreme, and hold that the life-tenant
is entitled to all the dividends, cash or stock, declared from the
earnings of the corporation. w In Pennsylvania a happy medium
between the two extremes has been reached. The courts of that
State apply equitable principles to the question, and thereby
award to the life-tenant so much of the stock dividend as repre-
sents earnings after the creation of his estate, leaving those earned
before the death of the settlor or testator, and thus capitalized, to
be kept for the remainderman. w The language of Mr. Justice
Gordon in Vinton's Appeal, so clearly states the justice of this
position that it is worthy of repetition:
"It is, indeed, true, as said by Mr. Chief Justice Chapman in Minot vi.
Paine, 99 Mass. xor, that the rule which regards cash dividends, however
large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital, is a very sim-
ple and convenient one, and may relieve trustees and courts of much trouble,
but it is certainly not one that commends itself for its justice and equity,
neither does it at all regard the facts of a case like that of Earp's Appeal, or
like the case in hand. To us, it seems like a bungling rule of law that, at one
time, would give what is indisputably income to the remainderman, and, at
another, what is as clearly capital to the life-tenant. It is however, enough
for us that our own authorities repudiate such a rule. In the case last referred
to, it was held, that dividends from a corporate surplus fund, accumulated
before the testator's death, must be regarded as part of the stock forming the
t Price v. Anderson, 15 Sim. 473 ; Bates v. McKinley, 31 Beav. 281 ; Bar-
ton's Trust, L. R. 5 Eq. 238.
u Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. ioz ; Leland v. Hayden, 1oz Mass. 542 ; Rand
v. Hubbell, I15 Mass. 461.
v Richardson v. Richardson, 75 Me. 573.
w Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368 ; Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 286;.
Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 204; Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 434 ; Smith's Estate,
14O Pa. St. 344.
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trust fund, whilst after-accumulations, though distributed in the shape of
stock, must be treated as income, and go to the life-tenant., In like manner it
was held, in Wiltbank's Appeal, that earnings, or profits, of the stock of a
decedent, made after his death, were income, though put into the form of cap-
ital by the issue of new stock, and it was there said, that ' equity, seeking the
substance of things, found that the new stock was but a productand was,
therefore, income.' So may we say in this case ; equity seeking, not mere con-
venience, but the substance of things, finds the dividend, in controversy, to be
part of the actual capital of the company ; money raised by a sale of part of its
original franchise and realty ; that which its stock most specifically and directly
represents, hence, it awards the product to him in whom the stock is finally to
vest. Assume the contrary doctrine, and that which we have already pointed
out may at any time occur ; on a sale of the entire franchise and property of
the company, with a like order by its directors for a distribution of the money
so raised, the dividends must go, regardless of the equities of the parties, to
the life-tenant, and nothing whatever be left for the remainderman. This
might be very convenient for trustees and courts, for, as it would definitely
close out the trust, there would be no farther trouble about it; nevertheless,
the justice of such a disposition of the trust would be more than doubtful.
Again, this same doctrine, which makes cash dividends income, and stock div-
idends capital, would often work with equal harshness upon the interest of the
life-tenant. For corporate earnings might be retained for an indefinite length
of time, and then be distributed in the shape of stock shares, which the rule
contended for would at once pronounce to be capital, and thus would the bene-
ficiary be deprived of his income. Than this, far better is our Pennsylvania
doctrine, admirably stated by our brother, Mr. Justice Paxson, in Moss's
Appeal, as follows: ' But where a corporation, having actually made profits,
proceeds to distribute such profits amongst the stockholders, the tenant for
life would be entitled to receive them, and this without regard to the form of
the transaction. Equity, which disregards the form and grasps the substance,
would award the thing distributed, whether stock or moneys, to whomsoever
was entitled to the profits."'
Mr. Morawetz (in his invaluable work on "Private Corpora-
tions" 2d Ed. §§ 468-47) in discussing stock dividends with
relation to the rights of life-tenants and remaindermen, after say-
ing that the weight of reason and authority appears to be against
the Massachusetts rule, continues :
"While the payment of a stock dividend is not an actual distribution of
profits, it does materially affect the rights of the shareholders in respect of the
accumulated profits. The effect of a stock dividend is to capitalize the accu-
mulated profits permanently. The profits on account of which a stock dividend
is declared can never afterwards be distributed among the shareholders as
dividends, and, after the new shares have been issued, the right of the corpo-
ration to pay further dividends, and the right of the shareholders to demand
them, must be considered with reference to the increased nominal capital.
The payment of a stock dividend is not merely an increase of the nominal
amount of the shares, leaving the rights of the shareholders unchanged. In
substance and effect, it amounts to a distribution of profits among the share-
holders in cash, and a subsequent purchase of new shares in the company with
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the sums distributed. * * * * It is difficult to follow
the reasoning by which these (Massachusetts) conclusions and distinctions were
reached. Reasoning based upon legal technicalities can clearly be of no ser-
vice in ascertaining the intentions of a grantor. The rule in Minot's case
undoubtedly has the merit of being simple and of easy application. But that
does not prove it would carry out the intentions of the grantor of a trust of this
kind. Indeed, it seems almost self evident that a simple grant of the income
of shares is not in fact intended as a grant of all cash dividends and of no stock
dividends ; and if the general purpose of a grant of this description is consid-
ered, it becomes evident that such a construction would in many cases defeat
the intentions of the grantor rather than carry them out."
We think, then, that viewing the question from the standpoint
of equity and justice, a fair consensus of the rule as to the divis-
ion of the earnings of a corporation, between life-tenants and
remaindermen, may be thus stated: The life-tenant shall have
all the regular cash dividends of earnings during the existence of
his estate, irrespective of the time they were earned, and shall
also have the extraordinary cash dividends, unless earned before
the creation of the life tenancy, the presumption being that they
were earned during that time. He shall also have the stock divi-
dends of earnings accumulated during his term, the presump-
tions being against him, in the absence of evidence that they were
earned during that time.
It has been held that the value of an option to subscribe for
new stock at par, belongs to the capital, unless the value of such
option is due to an enhanced value growing out of accumulated
earnings during the life tenancy, when it belongs to the income. x
It is also held, that when the life-tenant dies between dividend
dates no apportionment can generally be made, although in Eng-
land it is required by statute. y
It is not uncommon for a corporation, when properly author-
ized, to issuie "preferred" or "guaranteed" stock; those words,
in this connection, being considered synonymous. This is dis-
tinguished from the other stock of the company, which is ordina-
rily designated as "common" or "deferred." The usual prefer-
ence in such stock is as to the payments of dividends, although, if
expressly so provided in the charter, it may relate, as well, to a
preference in a division of the assets upon the dissolution or
winding up of the corporation. Preferred stock may also be
"cumulative;" the distinction being, that in the former the
x Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 286 ; Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 204 ; Bid-
dle's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 278.
y Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368; Clapp v. Astor, 2 Ed. Ch. (N. Y.) 319;
In Re Maxwell's Trust, i H. & M. Ch. 6zo.
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arrears of the preferred rate must be made up out of the profits
subsequently earned, irrespective of the dividend year in which
they were earned, and before any distribution is made to the other
stockholders; while non-cumulative preferred stock is entitled to
a preference in dividends only from the profits of each year.
Unless expressly provided otherwise, preferred stock is held to be
non-cumulative.
Dividends upon the preferred, like those upon the common
stock, are payable only out of the earnings and require their
declaration by the board'of directors before they can be de-
manded. z
We have already seen, that a holder of the general stock of a
corporation is entitled to relief, in equity, to compel the directors
to declare dividends of accumulated profits, rightfully applicable
to that purpose. This right extends equally to its preferred stock-
holders, to whom it applies with greater strictness if their holdings
are non-cumulative, as they can with more justice demand the
payment of that for which their stock seems to call, the annual
distribution of a fixed rate.
The large increase in corporate holdings in this country during
the past decade, and the reasonable certainty of their continued
expansion, warrants the belief that the subject we have discussed
will be of interest to the legal profession, and, it is hoped, of some
value to those whom it chiefly concerns -the stockholders of the
many American corporations, whose hopes for increasing dividends
are evidenced by their willingness to risk their capital in new
ventures, developing the wealth and industries of our country.
z New York, etc. R. R. Co. v. Nickals, z9 U. S. 296.
